A little before dawn on December 12, 2007, Naxalites of the Communist Party of India (Maoist) blew up railway track at two different places in Bihar – the first one near Bhalui halt station on Jhajha-Kiul section of East Central Railway, disrupting train services on the Patna-Howrah main line and the other on the single line between Kajra and Urain stations on Kiul-Jamalpur section of Eastern Railway. Train services were severely affected in these sections and at least 15 trains had to be halted at different places for varying duration, causing inconvenience and hardship to innocent passengers, and financial loss to the Railways.
Apparently, the rebels were seeking to avenge the death penalty awarded to five of their colleagues –– Ashok Yadav, Umesh Yadav, Naresh Yadav, Dhaneshwar Yadav and Suresh Yadav. A Fast Track Court in Banka district had, on December 6, awarded the death sentence to the five Maoists for killing three policemen and injuring three more at a temple in Gaura village on November 3, 2005.
The Railways have become a soft target for the Maoists that include attacks on Railway Police Forces personnel. According to the author’s databases on Maoist violence, in 2007 the rebels have made the Railways as their target on at least 25 occasions in Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and West Bengal. These include:
- April 8, 2007: Attack on Howrah-Mokama passenger train near Narganjo railway station, Jasidih-Jhajha section, Asansol division of Eastern Railway, in Bihar, in which two Railway Protection Force (RPF) personnel were killed and five more injured. During the attack, the rebels also looted an SLR, two carbines and two pistols from the slain and injured RPF personnel.
- May 8: Removal of two rail tracks causing derailment of a goods train carrying iron ore, at Nareli in the Dantewada district, Chhattisgarh. The CPI-Maoists also abducted four staff of the train, later released them unharmed after looting their wireless sets.
- May 27: Blowing up a railway bridge between Bacheli and Kirandul causing derailment of three wagons of a goods train in Dantewada district.
- June 20: Attack on Kathgodam Express train at a railway crossing near Sonepur station, Saran district, Bihar, in which two RPF personnel were killed and seven persons, including three passengers injured.
- June 24: Blowing up of railways tracks at several places resulting in extensive damage to the Kirandul-Visakhapatnam railway line in Dantewada district, thus severely impairing the transportation to Visakhapatnam of iron ore mined in the Bailadila mines of the National Mineral Development Corporation.
- June 27: Damaging and burning Biramdih railway station, Purulia district, West Bengal and rigging the tracks with explosives
According to information made available to Parliament, in 2006, there were nine attacks on the Railways. In these, the Railways had suffered a loss of nearly five crore on account of damage to railway property; this is besides the opportunity cost for which figures are not available.
Responding to Unstarred Question No. 3240 in the Lok Sabha, the Union Minister for Railways, on September 6, 2007, said that the Railways had suffered a loss of Rs 3,89,05,000 in 2007, during the ‘economic blockade’ called by the Maoists in late-June 2007. During the ‘economic blockade’ the railways were especially made targets of Maoist violence.
Such repeated attacks on the Railways were not heard of until 2006. Earlier, there was a lone incident in 1990 in which some 40 passengers were killed when cadres of the then People’s War Group (PWG) set ablaze a compartment of the Kakatiya Express, an inter-city day train––at Charlapalli near Hyderabad. This incident led to resentment against the rebels and severely eroded the sympathy they enjoyed among the people of the State. Sensing the outrage that the incident had caused among the people, the then PWG’s leadership, subsequently, issued a public apology and claimed that the act was inadvertent.
Clearly, these repeated attacks on the Railways are mindless acts of violence. They demonstrate the violent capacities of the rebels to cause extensive damage to soft targets and affect normal life. Despite the best efforts of the government, it would be virtually impossible to keep secure the entire stretch of railway track in Maoist territory. The best response to these attacks would, perhaps, be to accord the widest publicity in the national and vernacular media vividly explaining the cumulative loss they had caused and the hardship that the people experienced.
The annual “Heroes’ Day” speech delivered by LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran on November 27, amid continuing attacks by the government forces, brought out in no uncertain terms his dissatisfaction with the international community’s approach towards the Tamils of Sri Lanka. The LTTE supremo came down heavily on the international community for displaying, what he called, “partisan and unjust conduct”, which “severely undermined the confidence” of Tamil people on them. On the whole “it has paved the way for the breakdown of the ceasefire and the peace efforts.” According to the LTTE chief, “even the countries that are the guardians of the peace efforts succumbed to the deception of the Sinhala State” and listed “freedom movement as a terrorist organisation”. In reality, there is a general perception among the Tamils of Sri Lanka that the indiscriminate anti-terrorist policies of the Western countries have boosted the morale of the belligerent Sinhalese elite.
Prabhakaran’s “Heroes’ Day” speeches apart from self-validation are also significant pointers to the action plan of the rebel group for the ensuing year. The tone and tenor of these speeches seek to galvanise the cadres and the diaspora community for the Tamil cause. In fact, the “Heroes’ Day” celebrations have now assumed the status of an annual festival among the Tamils of Sri Lanka. Notably, this year’s speech was defensive and less on the rhetoric, capturing more the mood of disappointment over the military strategy employed by the Rajapaksa government than sharpening the political line.
Prabhakaran’s criticism of international community is in response to the steps taken by some of the western governments to check pro-LTTE activities in their countries. After the ban by EU, there were cases of LTTE operatives nabbed by security forces and cases of LTTE networks isolated and busted in Europe and North America. Such cases must have come as a setback for the LTTE operations, especially when Colombo had shifted a gear with its plans of military assault on the North.
In fact, over the past two years, the LTTE repeatedly appealed to “the international community” to pressurise the Colombo government to reach a deal but with little success. In his speech last year, Prabhakaran had emphasised that the LTTE had bent over backwards to maintain the ceasefire and negotiate an agreement despite grave provocations from the Lankan government. But as the Lankan army mounted its offensives and the EU banned LTTE, it alleged that international community was not playing an impartial role in the crisis.
The Lankan government has, on the other hand, sold it convincingly to the international community that it was the LTTE which provoked the government forces by launching suicide attacks and aerial raids. The mutual mudslinging has served the interests of the spoilers on both sides and reversed the peace process.
However, the fact that the Sri Lankan government is looking away from the path of dialogue and negotiation, strengthens the suspicion among the Tamils that many powerful countries around the world tacitly approve of these policies. Prabhakaran’s assertion that the international community is responsible for the failure of the peace process is grounded in this larger feeling of dismay among the Tamils of Sri Lanka. Many neutral observers also agree that the government has no alternate peace plan or political solution at the moment. It would rather parade its military victory in the East as a possible alternative to an otherwise improbable dialogic process of seeking a southern political consensus on “what-to-offer” to the disgruntled Tamils.
Prabhakaran is not entirely off the mark when he says that “no political party in the South has the political honesty or firmness in policy to find a just solution to the Tamil national question”. The efforts at various levels to generate a power-sharing arrangement that would be acceptable to the Tamils have failed because of the competitive jingoism by political parties. If one political party or leader would bring in some idea at the table others would unite and rubbish it as inimical to the integrity of the Sri Lankan state. The latest body to frame a devolution proposal, which was composed of relatively less hawkish politicians and legal experts known for their progressive outlook, could only produce four different drafts. The only consensus that they can possibly arrive at ever is to deny any meaningful delegation of power to the Tamils that can resolve the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka.
While Prabhakaran’s perceptions of the southern political parties and politicians are shared by many impartial analysts in Sri Lanka and outside, his observations about international community are likely to be regarded as a naïve and desperate attempt to invoke the sympathy of the observers at the international level towards the genuine aspirations of the Tamils. However, now that the LTTE, as a militant organisation, stands at a critical period in its history, such irate remarks are more likely to earn disfavour than inspire sympathy of the external actors.
Moreover, there is a significant section within the “international community”, which is critical of the policies of the Sri Lankan government. The Sri Lankan government is equally wary of “international community” in that sense. It should ideally be the strategy of the Tamil leadership (LTTE included) to show their sense of gratitude to these forces which may not be in the decision-making structures but having the ability to subject the issue to wider debate at the international level.
In his speech, the LTTE supremo also warned the government for overstretching itself by putting “its feet too wide apart in our land (one in East and the other in the North) as it did during past battles”. He claimed that the Sinhala nation had fallen into the trap set by the LTTE by getting into the East where they would be “forced to commit large numbers of troops to rule land without people”. Calling Operation “Ellalan”— the combined Black Tiger and Tamil Eelam Air Force attack — a success, he warned that “those who plan to destroy the Tamil nation will, in the end, be forced to face their own destruction”. Prabhakaran also indirectly alluded to the success of LTTE’s militant strategy in his speech and said that “only when we proved our military prowess and only when we were militarily in a position of strength that the Sinhala nation signed the ceasefire agreement”.
There is an old argument that a militarily weak LTTE would be a sitting-duck for the militarily stronger Sri Lankan armed force. Moreover, no government in Colombo is likely to concede any meaningful autonomy to a weakened Tamil community, if LTTE were to be neutralised militarily. Even if these are genuine arguments, they do not cut much ice with the so called “international community”, which has no patience for militant tactics. The LTTE leadership has to understand that they are operating in an environment where militancy has lost all its legitimacy whatsoever. A great deal of LTTE’s effort ought to be directed towards strengthening its political face. This has to be supplemented with a genuine desire to arrive at a peaceful settlement.
Otherwise, even if the Tigers have legitimate grievances, their tactics would leave them on the wrong side of history. While one may not doubt the capacity of the Tamil community to bounce back even after any eventual military defeat, it is infinitely wiser to secure the legitimate demands through the backing of the international community by adopting a non-militant approach as a revised strategy. This will also put the Sri Lankan government on the defensive. There is also a small but sympathetic constituency of silent peace-makers amongst the Sinhalese civil society who bear no animosity towards the Tamils and would like to support a transformed LTTE. The LTTE has to work towards changing its image from that of a ruthless war-making machine to a reasonable political entity fighting for the genuine rights of the Tamils.
In such circ*mstances, the LTTE has no other option but to learn to work with the international community and inspire their confidence in their strategy. Militant posturing will only indirectly contribute to the Sri Lankan government’s arguments that LTTE could never be trusted with any political commitment to sustain any dialogue for peace
The street violence that gripped Assam’s main city Guwahati on November 24 will not easily fade from public memory. Trouble brewed when a peaceful protest rally organized by the All Assam Adivasi Students’ Association (AAASA),demanding scheduled tribe status for the adivasi community, turned violent leading to chaos and disorder. Some of the younger adivasi protestors went on a rampage between heavily populated areas of Beltola Chariali and Beltola Survey destroying vehicles and shops on the way. Consequently, due to police apathy and inability to react quickly to the outbreak of violence, locals took “law and order” into their hands and attacked the protestors. In the violence that ensued, nearly 200 adivasis were injured and one was killed.
Three essential points emerge from the incident. First, that 4,000-5,000 protestors armed with bows and arrows marched on the street was reason enough for creating fear and intimidation amongst the civilian population residing in the area. Second, that the mob could turn violent was not unforeseen. Indeed, the Ganesh Guri, Beltola and Basistha areas are heavily crowded areas with a mixed cluster of population. Some are migrants from rural Assam where there exists discrimination against the adivasi tea workers. It is predictable that they would be prone to violent acts at the slightest provocation from the adivasis. Third, for the state administrative officials to argue that since the AAASA had taken permission only for a public meeting and not for a protest march, they were unable to predict the events that followed is an unreasonable explanation. It is impossible for nearly 5, 000 armed people to cover a distance of six to seven kilometers and reach the heavily fortified Dispur area of the state secretariat without being noticed. Not only that, the protestors attacked the vehicle of Independent Member of State Legislative Assembly, Tara Prasad Das and his wife, raising real time tactical questions about the training, morale and capability of the state police to ensure law and order.
Predictably, the incident has got extremely politicized with national, regional and local parties joining the fray of accusations and counter accusations. With Panchayat elections around the corner, the incident has taken a political hue. The Opposition parties in the state have demanded the resignation of the Tarun Gogoi-led Congress Government. Rumours are afloat that the Asom Gana Parishad, one of the main opposition parties, might have engineered the violence in order to deviate the peoples’ attention from the recent Saikia Commission Report indicting many of its party members of corruption. The political “spin off” of the violence is clearly visible with Shibu Soren, leader of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, visiting Guwahati to take stock of the situation as most of the adivasis belong to Jharkhand.
It is indeed worrisome that the strained social fabric and uneasy peace is spreading to other areas inhabited by tea garden workers. On November 28, large-scale violence broke out in the adjoining district of Sonitpur during a bandh called by the Chaotali Students’ Union (CSU). Since the bandh invoked a meager response from the locals, bandh supporters entered Tezpur town and forcefully tried to block roads and attacked business establishments and shops. Locals, on their part, very similar in pattern to the November 24 Beltola incidents retaliated violently. This resulted in thousands of nearby tea-garden workers rushing to the town with bows and arrows to add support to the CSU. These mobs managed to destroy the Rangapara police station and dispersed only after the army and the Central Reserve Police Force personnel were rushed to the area.
The prompt response by civil society organizations and public outpouring of support for victims of the November 24 violence is perhaps the only saving grace for Assam. The Chief Minister, Tarun Gogoi acknowledged this fact in a press conference on December 1 at Guwahati. Moreover, prominent publication groups like Anwesha, without taking sides, openly condemned the violence. The local media showed high maturity while reporting the incidents by not engaging in “hyperbole journalism”. Prominent Assamese public personalities like Dr Amalendu Guha, Dr Hiren Gohain, Harekrishna Deka, and Prof Hiren Dutta had cautioned the local media against highlighting incidents that could aggravate the already tense situation.
The question however remains: how to prevent such violent incidents in the future? The answer lies at both the sociological and strategic level. Sociologically, as long as discrimination exists at the social, economic and political level, marginalized people will resort to “violent and non-violent” means to express their grievances. The root causes of their deprivation and resultant grievances must be realistically addressed. Strategically, and as an immediate response, the Assam state police needs to be better trained and equipped, motivated and better paid if at all an efficient and prompt pre-emptive action is to be activated to thwart similar acts of internal violence in the future.
The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has strongly denied news reports that the launch of an Israeli spy satellite aboard the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) has been delayed or even cancelled because of US pressure. The news reports, while speculative in nature, have certain inconsistencies that need to be contested. Foremost among these being there is a quid pro quo element by way of sharing of data; since the satellite is wholly Israeli owned and operated, ISRO is only providing a commercial service with no quid pro quo involved. Moreover, the data from this satellite is to be marketed commercially by the American Northrop Grumman Industries, albeit to selected “high-value customers”. Analysts have also pointed out the limited value of imagery from the TechSAR satellite for India since the Satellite Aperture Radar (SAR) technology used cannot penetrate vegetation. In any case, other than the veto over the sale of the Arrow anti-missile system to India, the US has always shown a degree of comfort with the level of transfer of technology to India by Israel. A second reason propounded by the media reports is that the launch has been cancelled following protests by those Arab countries that would come under the ‘gaze’ of Israel’s spy-in-the-sky. This is an unreasonable explanation since in any case the Israelis can use their Shavit launch vehicle or, for that matter, any other third country launcher, not necessarily India’s, to loft the satellite. A third ‘spin’ is that the Israelis had a re-think because of India’s ties with Iran. This theory also flies in the face of the evolving strategic equation between India and Israel, especially in the defence production sphere.
The close defence relationship between India and Israel with the blessings of the US was an outcome of a chain of events primarily revolving around increasing US alarm at China's rising military power, much of which was built on the back of Israeli armaments and which threatened the American military presence off Taiwan. Around the time the US was pressurising Israel to cut-off its arms supplies with China; India was looking for alternative suppliers of defence equipment so as to reduce its dependency on the Russian arms manufacturers.
The defence supplies component of the India-Israel relationship has proved to be a symbiotic one, with India on the lookout for dependable suppliers to modernise its military. Israel, on the other hand, has an export-oriented defence industry with more than 75 per cent of Israeli defense sales going to foreign militaries, with the remaining 25 per cent to the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). In 2006 alone, India purchased $1.5 billion worth of equipment, nearly 30 per cent of Israel’s foreign defence sales of $4.4 billion, making it the largest customer of the Israeli military industries. The India-Israel relationship has moved beyond the buyer-seller framework to an integrated one ranging from R&D to customized platforms and products. With the Indian military industrial complex yet to attain critical mass due to systemic problems, the Israeli connection has proved to be a critical one.
Other factors that make Israel a natural partner, particularly when compared with European and US alternatives, include a mutual desire to keep the relationship low profile and the fact that both face similar threats from low-intensity conflict. In addition, Israel has been willing to go the extra mile when it comes to accommodating India’s request for transfer of technology and joint production agreements in an effort to strengthen the strategic relationship. It was calculations such as these that went into the Israeli decision in November 2005 to forego its stated policy of strategic self-reliance and use Indian satellite launch vehicles to loft TechSAR into space.
The media scrutiny over the satellite launch arises from the fact that anything relating to India-Israel connection is viewed with curiosity and intrigue. Such news, however speculative, generates considerable interest given the nature of partisan politics prevailing at the moment.
In the recently concluded ASEAN Summit (November 18-22), apart from issues like Myanmar, ASEAN Charter and ASEAN Economic Community, nuclear energy was also discussed at length. A declaration on safeguarding the environment and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was agreed by the ASEAN members. This was, in spite of the fact that many non-governmental organisations as well as domestic pressure groups in some of the ASEAN countries have consistently raised apprehension about the safety of nuclear power plants which lie in the seismically active zones. The leaders also agreed on the establishment of nuclear safety regime with a proposed regional monitoring laboratory located in Pahang state in Malaysia that would help scientists of the region to study the safety of their respective nuclear power plants.
The decision has given an impetus to many Southeast Asian states to draw a roadmap. Foremost among those are Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand. Vietnam has already installed a research reactor in Dalat and has been seeking the help of the US for producing power from low-enriched uranium. It has on the same footing sought technical know-how from France, South Korea and Russia for constructing a new nuclear power plant. On the other hand, Indonesia has envisaged a nuclear power plant near Mount Muria in Central Java and plans to start production from 2017. Though there has been active resistance to Indonesia nuclear power plant from Muslim organisations like Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) because of the vulnerability of the location to the volcanically active Mount Muria. This is in addition to the already planned nuclear power plant in Madura which is expected to be operational by 2024. Apart from these, Indonesia is also considering a ‘floating nuclear power plant’ in Sulawesi.
The Electricity Generating Agency of Thailand (EGAT) similarly has been contemplating commissioning a 4-Giga Watt nuclear power plant by 2015 and hopes to start commercial production by 2020. Apart from these three Southeast Asian countries, Philippines has been looking into the carbon emission free electricity generation but its experience with the Batan nuclear power plant has not been particularly fruitful due to allegations of kickbacks and a backlash over the dangers of a nuclear power plant. However, realising the need for clean energy, Philippines is reconsidering to kickstart power generation from the Batan plant which had been closed since 1988. Even globally isolated country like Myanmar has proactively approached the issue of nuclear energy by seeking technical cooperation with Russia to build a 10 Mw light water reactor. Though discussion with the Russian federal Agency were initiated in 2003 but due to financial problems the talks were stalled. Recent reports confirm that negotiations have once again resumed.
For fringe players like Malaysia and Singapore the issue of nuclear power generation has not yet featured in their planning process. Though Malaysia has been operating a research reactor, no policy guidelines exists on nuclear power generation. For Singapore, which is facing rising demand for electricity, setting up a nuclear plant is constrained by limited land area and an option for a ‘floating nuclear power plant’ is intensely debated.
Nuclear power plant is a controversial issue. Enriched uranium used for power generation needs to be processed and the disposal of spent fuel requires huge investment and stringent safety procedures. Most of the Southeast Asian countries lack technical expertise for nuclear power generation and since some of the proposed power plants are situated close to international waterways, any radiation leakage would not only have a cascading effect on the population but also disastrous consequences on the marine ecology and maritime trade. Terror groups like Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah and the dangers of the dirty bomb falling into unscrupulous hands add to the fear. ASEAN has devised measures like Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) to thwart any nuclear weapon ambitions of its member states as well as monitoring ships carrying nuclear material with the exception of the US.
Nuclear energy has positive advantages for countries in Southeast Asia. But the need for clean renewable energy does not necessarily mean a wholehearted consensus for nuclear energy. It would be interesting to see how far the plans for nuclear power generation fructify in Southeast Asia.
Malaysia’s so-called multi-ethnic harmony was deeply shaken when the Hindu Rights Action Force (Hindraf) organised in Kuala Lumpur the largest ever mass protest against the ‘marginalisation’ of ethnic Indians as a consequence of the government’s ‘discriminatory’ policy. The incident has clearly exposed Malaysia’s political class of creating and favouring a unified trans-racial community called Bangsa Malaysia (‘Malaysian race’). The federal Constitution accords special privileges to these Bumiputera and this is not for the first time that the problems of unfair treatment towards the ethnic Indians have come to the centrestage. The Malaysian Police had targeted IT professionals of Indian origin in March 2003 on grounds of checking illegal immigration. In fact, ethnic tensions had previously erupted as early as December 1969 when over a 100 people were killed in clashes between the Malays and the Chinese. This prompted Dr Mahathir to launch a New Economic Policy in 1971 and a determined effort to encourage the Bumiputeras and raise their share in the economy – at the cost of the ethnic Chinese and the Indians. Samy Vellu of the Malaysian Indian Congress had served as the Works Minister in the Mahathir cabinet and was the sole representative of the ethnic Indian community.
The demonstration comprising about 10,000 people was heading towards the British High Commission to submit a memorandum seeking to appoint a counsel to represent the Indian community in a class action suit. The memorandum called for an emergency UN resolution condemning the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of ethnic Indians and urged the UK to lead a global condemnation of Malaysia’s ‘atrocities’ against the Indians. The Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, who also holds the Internal Security portfolio, taking grave exception to the memorandum indicated the government would not hesitate to use the Internal Security Act to prevent demonstrations. Some 88 ethnic Indians were arrested on November 28.
Indians constitute 8 per cent of the population in Malaysia totalling 1.8 million and of whom about 90 per cent are Tamils. But in proportion to their number they control very little wealth. In contrast, the Chinese constitute about 25 per cent of the population and the majority Malays roughly 60 per cent. Although there are a large number of Indians as doctors and lawyers; they are a far greater number ‘under-represented’ in other sectors.
It would be unrealistic to expect India to remain unaffected by the current developments. Malaysia’s institutionalised policy of discrimination towards the Indian Diaspora (mostly Tamils) is bound to create pressure on the Centre from its coalition partner in Tamil Nadu to respond in a forceful manner. Not surprisingly, Hindraf leader P. Watythamoorthy met Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi on December 2 to lobby for the cause of the Malaysian Indians. The Indian government needs to be sensitive to the problems and concerns of its diaspora especially in Southeast Asia and unflinchingly take a principled position. During the freedom struggle leaders like Subhash Chandra Bose sought their cooperation and now a ‘Rising India’ with its newfound economic musclepower can ill-afford to ignore its economic diaspora.
India’s economic ties with Malaysia have been an intrinsic part of its Look East policy. The two share many common multilateral forums such as ASEAN and the WTO and are at the forefront of taking up the cause of the developing world. Like Malaysia, India believes that the WTO should not introduce non-trade issues into trade negotiations. Both countries will begin negotiating the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) in January 2008. This will give an impetus to trade and investment between the two. India has an unfavourable balance of trade with exports to Malaysia at $1.3 billion and imports at $5.3 billion. The total trade is expected to rise to $16 billion by 2012. Malaysia is the second biggest ASEAN investor in India and has made a total direct investment of about $143 million in the period August 1991 to July 2007. Given the strong economic connect, India should not only powerfully voice and stand for the welfare of the ethnic Indian community but also assert influence over the Malaysian government to effectively address the problem.
While India’s experience of shaping a plural democracy may serve as a model, Prime Minister Badawi’s own statement bears recalling: “What is important is that the government has to be fair to all because if we concentrate only on one group, others will complain.”
For the last one year regular installments of reports and analyses have appeared in the media on the challenges countries would face as a result of climate change and its mitigation and adaptation has been on the top of the agenda. The most recent one is the release of the Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world or HDR. In carbon dioxide terms, the HDR shows that with 2004 as base year, the per capita carbon dioxide emission of India is 1.2 ton and its global share is 4.6 per cent, whereas that of the US is 20.9 ton and 20.6 per cent and China 3.8 ton and 17.3 per cent. A few years ago, sceptics of the human-induced climate change were in large strength. But now barring a few, like the President of the Czech Republic who denied the phenomenon due to human interference in a BBC Hard Talk programme, there is a general agreement on the seriousness of the issue. Temperatures have already registered a 0.7 degree C increase since the age of industrialization. With business-as-usual, the threshold of crossing 2 degree C must be prevented or else there will be dangerous climate change within a decade.
The HDR released a week prior to UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCC) Conference at Nusa Dua, Bali of the Thirteenth Session of Conference Parties (COP13) and Third Session of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 3) from 3 to 14 December 2007 is indeed significance (it needs to be noted that the USA is now the only non- signatory to the Kyoto Protocol). The most important issue at the Bali conference will be the post-Kyoto Protocol regime when it comes to an end in 2012. By bringing out an issue of the HDR devoted to fighting climate change the agenda has been firmly placed on the international table.
According to the an high ranking official of the Ministry of Environment and Forests, the developing projects India has undertaken to reduce impacts of climate change is already cutting into its gross domestic product(GDP). In 2006-07 India used 2.17 per cent of its GDP on projects to reduce vulnerability to climate change. This evidence does not support the Stern Report which states that taking action to reduce climate change would not hurt growing economies. The extreme vulnerability of India to impacts are well known. Economic losses due to natural disasters have eroded 2 per cent of country’s GDP during 1996-2001 and consumed 12 per cent of government revenue. With climate induced floods, droughts and sea storms predicted at regular intervals the impact will be far serious. Studies by Indian economists have concluded that emission reduction imposes costs in terms of lower GDP and higher poverty. If India is to reduce emissions, it should be compensated for the loss.
It is, therefore, on this account that the HDR was described as fundamentally misconceived and not based on “equity” by the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. The stipulation of the report – of developed countries reducing emission by 80 per cent and developing countries by 20 per cent by 2050 – looked egalitarian but, in fact it was nowhere near it.
Besides the above, each year since 2002 ( just before the World Summit on Sustainable Development) the print media invariably displays a front page a photograph (mostly from NASA) indicating a brown cloud over India/Asia (earlier referred to as the Asian Brown Cloud but now renamed as the Atmospheric Brown Cloud) due to a faulty and unregulated biomass burning and soot as aerosols. The report argued that the brown haze is a glaring testimony to the perils of global warming and its negative impact on even the retreat of Himalayan glaciers. It is evident that the ABC has been consistently propagated by the developed countries to shift the blame on global warming to the developing countries.
India is fast adapting to climate change even though the road is arduous and cooperation minimum from the developed world. Cereal output has dropped and some small islands in the Sundarbans are under water. As sea-level rises, Bangladeshis have nowhere else to go but India. Extreme weather events and changing monsoon patterns already have threatened our farmers. Suicides are the norm. In such conditions it is difficult for any leader to plan for mitigation. The industrialized countries have a moral obligation to take the leadership role and work in tandem with the developing countries. After all this is the only world we have.
The Maoists continue to advance their violent campaign to capture political power through armed revolution. In the current year, till October 31, 571 lives have been lost in Maoist violence. Another 12, including two civilians and 10 personnel of the Mizo Battalion, were killed in an ambush on November 29 near Konta in Chhattisgarh. Correspondingly, the state response has been inadequate in containing the Maoists’ campaign and their influence. Strikingly various authorities continue to hold a widely divergent perception of the spatial spread of the Maoist movement. For example, replying to an unstarred question number 320 in the Rajya Sabha, on November 21, 2007, Minister of State (MoS) for Home Affairs Sriprakash Jaiswal said 91 districts in 11 States were affected by Maoist violence. On the other hand, the former Governor of Chhattisgarh, Lt Gen KM Seth said in an interview to a website a few months back: “I would like to share that currently from the figures I have been able to obtain, 256 districts have been declared as [N]axalite affected districts…” The MHA, one can reason, would like to underplay the spatial spread of the Maoists and one can equally argue that the Minister concerned was speaking merely of the number of districts in which Maoist violence was reported, and not of those in which the rebels have an influence –– intense to marginal. However, such variance in the figures is not only odd but misleading and explains the lack of a concerted approach to resolve the violence.
The MoS also said in his response that 11 States were Maoist affected. On can recall the statement of the then Cabinet Secretary, BK Chaturvedi, who while speaking at the annual Conference of Chief Secretaries, in New Delhi, on April 20 said that a total of 182 districts across 16 States were affected to varying degree. Facts and figures yet again collide. Of course the CPI (Maoists) would like to maintain that their influence is widespread, and their propaganda machine leaves no stone unturned in doing so. For example, Sonu –– who earlier used the alias Bhupathi –– whose actual name is Mallojula Venugopal and is the in-charge of the Dandakaranya Special Zone Committee (DKSZC) said in an interview published in People’s March, a Maoist mouthpiece, in July 2007: “… our party has a presence in 17 States…”
Similarly during 2005 and 2006 a series of contradictory statements were made. In March 2005, the Minister of State said in the Lok Sabha that “126 districts in 12 states are affected by Naxal violence/influence in varying degrees”. On the other hand, while replying to the debate on Demands for Grants for his Ministry, the Home Minister said in the Lok Sabha on May 22, 2006: “I have personally collected data... only 50 districts are affected.” The then Home Secretary, VK Duggal had his own version. He insisted on July 3 while addressing probationers at the National Police Academy, Hyderabad, that Maoist activity was noticed in merely “6.5 states to be precise.” Barely a month before the Home Minister’s reply in the Lok Sabha, the Prime Minister said on April 13, 2006 while inaugurating the second meeting of the Standing Committee of Chief Ministers of Naxalite-affected States, the Naxalite movement “has now spread to over-160 districts”.
The habit of taking a less grave view of the intensity of the Maoist movement is not unique to the UPA government. The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government, too, held a similar view. In November 2003, speaking at a meeting of the Coordination Committee of Naxalite affected States, the then Home Secretary said Naxalite violence affected 55 districts in 9 states. Less than a year later, in an official note circulated at a meeting of Chief Ministers of Naxalite-affected States on September 21, 2004 the MHA disclosed that 125 districts in 12 states were affected by Naxalite violence. For those who closely watch the Maoist movement, and are familiar with its trajectory and dynamics, it is strikingly clear that the figures have been botched-up, because the number of affected districts could not have shot up by 70 in 10 months.
In fact, in the absence of any information on the methodology followed by the MHA in determining how a district is classified as affected, or any informed debate on its scientific validity, observers of the Maoist movement outside the government are, thus, at a loss to understand the same.
To keep people ill-informed, bestow upon them the comfort of a sense of courage and confidence, as well as deceive the enemy, is one thing, but getting trapped in one’s own tales of deception is disastrous. It is high time that the MHA, and the various departments, understand the enormity of the situation and squarely addresses the Maoist problem, which the Prime Minister described more than once as the ‘single largest threat’ to India’s internal security.
A China Daily news item on November 22, 2007 states that both China and India will hold their first joint-army exercise in Yunan province of Southwest China in December. The piece titled “China-India Plan Joint Military Exercise” highlights the pledge of both the Chinese and Indian Prime Minister’s intent to push the Sino-Indian strategic partnership to a “new level”. Given the political value and media attention, the nature of this forthcoming exercise is seen as a “need” to fortify a sense of confidence between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Strategic observers in India are anxious to compute the benefits that the Indian army can generate given the PLA’s calculative and well-planned strategy of pushing its military diplomacy through “exchange” and “joint-exercises” with other militaries. Importantly, it remains to be seen whether this proposed first joint-army exercise would bring any difference to Sino-Indian strategic relationship at all.
The recent upswing in military ties between China and India focus upon two contentious issues: counter-terrorism and joint-army exercise. It was decided earlier this year during the Army Chief J.J.Singh’s visit to China that 100 Indian soldiers will be sent to China to participate in the proposed “counter-terrorism” drill. While the two navies have previously conducted a handful of joint-exercises, this will be the first time the two armies will rub shoulder to shoulder since the 1962 war. Given the recent Chinese claims on Arunachal Pradesh, China’s close proximity with Pakistan army and the unresolved border dispute, this proposed “counter-terrorism” drill is seen in many quarters as a Chinese eagerness rather than a totally bilateral initiative. In fact, the first proposal for a joint military exercise in Sino-Indian defence engagement came from the Chinese side in January 2001 when Li Peng visited India.
The contours of Chinese military diplomacy which rests on “joint-exercises” and “military exchanges” in recent times is clearly evidenced in various writings of the Chinese scholars and official papers. For example, in an editorial piece in the People’s Daily on 27th September, Yang Chengjun, a researcher with the Second Artillery Force of the PLA wrote, “…exchanges with foreign armies will expose China’s military forces to other types of military expertise, ideas and technologies”. This corresponds to a similar piece on 2nd July in the military newspaper PLA Daily which quotes Sun Haiyang, an expert from the unit of the Second Artillery Force that “through joint military exercise, we can learn from foreign armies and get acquainted with their advanced military theories and equipments and then we will try to find our own weakness and deficiencies…” Likewise, defending its military engagements with other countries, the official 2006 Chinese defence White Paper mentions that ‘China has military ties with more than 150 countries and has placed its military attaché offices in 107 countries’.
As per the Chinese official estimation, from 2002 to the end of 2006, PLA had 16 military exercises with 11 countries. However, PLA’s ability to continue to foster these “joint-military” exercises speaks about a two-pronged approach of its military diplomacy. On the one hand, PLA has taken initiatives to reassure others of its “peaceful” intentions through “exchange” and “joint-exercises” and on the other, it is cultivating ‘multi-talented’ young commanders to familiarize with foreign militaries and cope with the necessities of China’s new military revolution. In fact, one could say that in order to alleviate worries and criticisms of the “opaque” nature of its defence modernisation, PLA’s tactics is to use “joint-military” exercises as a diplomatic tool. Added to this, PLA’s current focus is on enhancing joint-training to advance the integrated joint operational capabilities of different services and arms.
Over the years, the military leaders have given priorities to a range of “joint-military exercises” which falls under their military modernization and reforms package. As a result, special interests have been given to search and rescue operations, training for high-tech wars, counter-terrorism, etc., to advance the interests of the PLA. In terms of intention, the PLA is interested for greater interactions with other well-trained soldiers to get a sense of their training and skills. In fact, going deeper into the “joint-exercises” practice, a salient feature of the Chinese military diplomacy is to allow PLA to participate in countering non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, and maritime piracy issues.
The proposed joint-exercise initiative between China and India is a carry-over of the first defence MoU signed on May 29, 2006 which explicitly mentions important contacts such as “frequent exchanges”, “an annual defence dialogue” and “joint-military exercise” in the fields of search and rescue, anti-piracy and counter-terrorism”. In fact, the proposed “counter-terrorism” drill serves the Chinese interest in primarily two ways: first, China’s own concern regarding separatist activities in Xinjiang and Tibet; and second, China’s counter-terrorism preparedness just before the 2008 Olympics. From the Chinese perspective, this exercise would go a long way in learning the Indian military’s tactics and methods in countering the insurgency in Kashmir. However, it has to be seen whether the exercise would reflect an evolving Sino-Indian security framework or simply a routine engagement at the defence level.
President Pervez Musharraf’s claim that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are safe as long as he is in charge has raised widespread speculation about the safety of Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. Musharraf’s statement comes at a time when Pakistan is going through one of its worst period of domestic instability. While the Pakistani Army is ostensibly portrayed as the least corrupt institution within Islamabad, most of the officers are radically Islamized having links with terrorist organizations like the Jamaat-i-Islami, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen, Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen and Jaish-e-Mohammed. These groups share similar ideology with the Al Qaida and pro-Talibans. The Nuclear Threat Initiative in its latest commissioned report, ‘Securing the Bomb 2007’ has identified armed jihadi groups operating in POK having merged with Al Qaida and, as the report claims, have demonstrated their willingness to use nuclear weapons. The Pakistani Army having total control over the country’s nuclear weapons and increasingly getting indoctrinated by the Al Qaeda can spell cataclysmic circ*mstances not only for India but also for the entire world.
The above contention has been disputed by many who regard the Pakistani Army as a safe bet. However, facts present a contrary view. President Musharraf has faced seven known assassination attempts in which military officers were involved. In a New York Times report of May 28, 2004, Pakistani military and intelligence officers were suspected of plotting to kill Musharraf. Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, Ron Suskind in his book The One Percent Doctrine has penned that Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, the suspected mastermind of the 9/11 attacks was arrested in the “safe house” of a serving Pakistani military officer having close links to Jamaat-i-Islami. Reports further indicate the illegal trafficking of nuclear material and technology by AQ Khan was known to the Pakistani Army since the nuclear arsenals were under its control. The decipherable links between the Pakistani Army in charge of nuclear weapons and terrorist groups undoubtedly poses grave threat to the country’s nuclear security. These evidences starkly reflect the incompetence of the Army to ensure the safety and security of its nuclear assets. Musharraf’s assurances to the international community about the efficiency of the Pakistani Army in securing its nuclear weapons should thus be viewed with scepticism.
The extremist organisations angered over the US-led war on terror and the consequent operations along the West Pakistan border are incessantly targeting the rank and file of the Pakistani Army to undermine support for Musharraf and weaken his position. With questionable loyalties within the army and sympathetic overtures to the cause of extremist groups, Musharraf can hardly vouch in favor of the Army to undertake responsibility for protecting Pakistan’s nukes.
Pakistan has in place a C2 (command and control) system for its strategic forces based on C4I2SR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance) since February 2000. However, doubts exist over the technical capabilities of the C4I2. There is also a general understanding and acceptance that there cannot be any foolproof C2 system as indicated by the recent unauthorised loading of six advanced cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads on a US-based B-52 bomber that was flown for more than three hours over several states.
Pakistan asserts that its warhead cores are physically separated from its detonation components. Concurrently, Islamabad claims that its weapons can be assembled quickly implying that though the weapons are de-mated, they are nonetheless collocated close to each other in an estimated six storage sites as reported by the Washington Post on November 11, 2007. Terrorist groups with proven intent can take advantage of the proximity and secure vital components like nuclear trigger devices. The physical security of Pak nukes gets further eroded when the nuclear devices and materials are transported from their original storage sites for routine testing and upgrading. Nuclear weapons and components held in extreme secrecy will become visible during such movements to an informed observer who can predict quite confidently the deployment sites of weapons.
Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals face considerable threat from its scientific community as well. As documented evidences indicate, Pakistan’s top nuclear scientists – Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed met Al Qaeda members on two occasions in 2000 and in 2001 and shared sensitive nuclear secrets. In the face of these dangerous revelations, the US responded with tens of millions of dollars worth of equipment ranging from helicopters, night-vision goggles, intrusion detectors and ID systems to help Pakistan secure its nuclear material, warheads and laboratories. However, the infamous AQ Khan Nuke-mart once again revealed the vulnerability of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
The US has categorically stated that Pakistan’s stockpile is safe. US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice’s statement, “We have noted the problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it….” in a January 2005 Congressional hearing is far from reassuring. By all counts, it appears that Washington is confident about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and does not foresee any grave consequences. But that the nukes can fall into unauthorised hands is a possibility that cannot be brushed aside. Unlike the US nuclear weapons that are based upon the sophisticated Permissive Action Links (PALs), a system which has two separate electronic operators that requires enter codes to arm and launch nuclear warheads, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are physically separated, i.e., the trigger is isolated from the weapon. However, they are no guarantees that the Pakistani nuclear custodians with jihadi outlook will simply switch allegiances and pass the sensitive materials that they guard to terrorists groups.
The US claims of “contingency plans” to safeguard Pakistan’s nukes are also contentious. The plans at best refers to the hope that the Pakistani military officials will cooperate with Washington to exterminate any imminent threat. But this is merely a hope which can be always belied. Noteworthy enough, this cooperation lacks adequate trust and understanding between the Americans and the Pakistanis. The US has limited knowledge about the location of the arsenal that they have offered to protect. More so, Pakistan has refused US experts any direct access to the six bunker sites where the Pakistani nuclear arsenal of an estimated 50 nuclear bombs is located. Any attempt by the US to take control of these weapons would make the situation further complicated. This creates sufficient grounds of concern for the safety of Pakistan’s nukes in the world particularly in India because of the proximity in distance and rising terrorism.
The US must refrain from conceding to face value assurances from Pakistan about the security of their nuclear arsenal. Several notable non-proliferation institutions have raised legitimate concerns about the dangers involved over loose nukes from Pakistan. The NTI in its report, ‘Securing the Bomb 2007’ has highlighted the presence of pro- Al Qaeda armed terrorist groups operating in Pakistan. The Pakistan Security Research Unit (University of Bradford) in its report dated November 18, 2007 has reiterated the inherent vulnerabilities in Pakistan’s nuclear security arrangements. With the deteriorating political situation persisting within Pakistan, the military can be stretched thin if the protest level rises and be unable to safeguard its nuclear assets.
